In 346 b.c. Aeschines and Demosthenes were colleagues on two of the embassies to Macedonia which ended the state of war between Athens and Macedonia which had persisted (admittedly in a desultory way) since 357. The whole process created some strange bedfellows, as different groups and individuals manoeuvred for reasons of principle, pragmatism or both. Demosthenes had been making bellicose noises about Philip since he realised late in the 350s that Philip represented a unique threat and was not just another in the line of vulnerable Macedonian kings to be destabilised, bolstered or placated according to the imperatives of Athenian foreign policy. Yet when in 348 Philokrates was indicted by graphē paranomōn for proposing (prematurely, as it turned out) to deal with Macedonia, Demosthenes was his supporting speaker in the trial.1 Aeschines too was initially hostile to the idea of accommodation with Philip and had worked with the senior Athenian politician of the day, Euboulos, to create an alliance of Greek states to resist the threat. For the Assembly the inclusion of people who had spoken against Philip offered the prospect of robust representation of Athens' interests in the peace negotiations.
In the event Philip managed to secure a peace which delivered more benefits to him than to Athens. But even before peace was finally concluded Demosthenes had begun to work against it. He indicted Aeschines after the latter served on the third Athenian embassy of 346. His rapid volte-face clearly indicates that his involvement in the peace process was pragmatic at most (if not cynical). It is less clear whether he had always intended to weaken the peace so soon or was reacting to events, seeking to distance himself from the results of the negotiations, as benefits failed to materialise, or genuinely convinced that his colleagues had not pressed Athens' interests as forcefully as they should. His choice of Aeschines may have been personal (certainly they came to hate each other). But it was not just personal. Aeschines was also targeted by another politician, Timarchus. This was a factional attack, not just a duel between carey Demosthenes and Aeschines. The choice of Aeschines was natural. Aeschines had committed to the peace and had argued for it strongly at Athens. And he remained committed. His change of heart made him an obvious target for suspicion within Athenian democratic culture, where those who served Athens at a distance like envoys and generals regularly found themselves objects of suspicion and targets of prosecution.
Demosthenes' group made two mistakes. Firstly they underestimated their target. Aeschines was by this time a seasoned politician. He struck back immediately and with devastating effect by prosecuting Timarchus. The second mistake was the involvement of Timarchus, whether this was his own initiative or he was chosen as front man for the faction. Aeschines invoked against Timarchus an action which is otherwise (for whatever reason) little attested in our sources, the dokimasia rhētorōn, (scrutiny of public speakers). This was not in fact a routine scrutiny of the kind used to test the qualifications of new citizens or candidates for office but an adhoc action open to ho boulomenos. The grounds available were varied, and Aeschines manages to squeeze in almost all of them. But the core allegation was that Timarchus had prostituted himself as a young man, an act which automatically rendered a man unfit to exercise the rights of Athenian citizenship.2 From Aeschines' speech it looks as though Timarchus had enough of a reputation to make such an attack feasible. Some of the public sneering about Timarchus' sexual past, which Aeschines narrates, was widely witnessed and so blatant invention by Aeschines immediately refutable, which suggests that Timarchus was in fact a target for gossip.3 He had however been active as a politician for at least fifteen years4 in a culture where prosecution was a favoured tool for weakening or eliminating opponents. And we have no evidence of a prior prosecution. It may be that the task of converting innuendo and suspicion into evidence and argument seemed too demand-
